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CHARACTERIZING POWER FOR SEPARATION-OFPOWERS PURPOSES
Tuan N. Samahon *
Every separation-of-powers case quickly encounters a fundamental threshold inquiry that remains surprisingly difficult, even
after almost 230 years of practice under the United States Constitution: what is the nature—legislative, executive, or judicial—of
the contested power exercised? The three cognate vesting clauses
in Articles I, II, and III use these undefined terms as if they are
intended to have substantive, separate content. 1 This tripartite division, which is inefficient by design, 2 is built into our constitutional system to safeguard individual liberty by assuring that powers to legislate, execute, and adjudicate the laws do not all fall into
a single set of (potentially) oppressive hands. 3 In many separationof-powers cases, whether the challenged institutional arrangement
has honored that principle turns on the categorization or characterization of the powers at stake.
To appreciate how characterization of power can quickly turn a
case upside down, consider three scenarios in which this fundamental concern about the nature of the power being exercised became quite apparent:

* Professor of Law, Villanova University, Charles Widger School of Law. The author
presented a version of this article during the University of Richmond Law Review’s Symposium: Defining the Constitution’s President Through Legal & Political Conflict (Oct. 27,
2017). I thank Todd Aagaard for his comments and Stephanie Mersch for her research assistance.
1. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress . . . .”), with id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested
in a President . . . .”), and id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power . . . shall be vested in one
supreme Court . . . .”).
2. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (“Convenience and efficiency are not
the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government . . . .”).
3. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 249 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001) (“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary,
in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”).
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1. When the United States Tax Court (“Tax Court”), staffed by
judges who lack Article III tenure, enters judgment against a taxpayer, does it exercise a portion of the judicial power of the United
States, such that it would be problematic for the President to have
power to remove its judges? If the Tax Court’s adjudicative function represents a “quasi-judicial” exercise of executive power, there
is no constitutional difficulty. But if the Tax Court’s adjudication
represents an exercise of judicial power by officers not cloaked in
Article III tenure, it surely violates the separation of powers.
2. What if the President (or his delegate) declines, on grounds
similar to those recently rejected by Congress, to enforce laws
against classes of persons who meet certain equitable criteria? If
the President merely executed the law in a “quasi-legislative” vein
by promulgating prospectively applicable rules that regulate a
group of persons by class, his action is permissible, assuming not
otherwise limited or qualified by the Constitution. But if the President exercised legislative power by directing his delegate to create
law, it is an impermissible aggrandizement at the expense of Congress’s legislative power.
3. When Congress grants the President the ability to cancel
items of spending, has it impermissibly granted him power to participate in the lawmaking process, or is the cancellation function
better understood simply as delegated discretion authorizing him
to execute spending laws? If Congress delegated discretion to the
executive to act, the cancellation power will withstand scrutiny under the Supreme Court’s delegation jurisprudence. If, however,
Congress has granted the President a role in legislating, the cancellation authority violates the requirements of bicameralism and
presentment.
In each case, the dispute’s resolution substantially turns on how
the Court characterizes the action in question. Categorization or
characterization of such disputed actions for separation-of-powers
purposes, however, is subject to competing judicial approaches,
which are colored by contested separation-of-powers and jurisprudential motivations. Given the importance of characterization, this
article offers a brief overview of how the Justices of the Supreme
Court have characterized power for separation-of-powers purposes.
Part I highlights four competing approaches to power characterization by reviewing illustrative separation-of-powers cases where
the disposition turned on power categorization. Part II assesses the
influence the late Justice Scalia exercised over the Court’s power
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characterization jurisprudence and cautions against oversimplification of the characterization inquiry.
I. THE APPROACHES TO CHARACTERIZATION
The Justices of the Supreme Court have engaged a variety of
approaches to characterize contested power, including tests that:
(1) principally emphasize the disputed function itself, (2) prioritize
the formal identity of the officer, (3) look to the pragmatic effects
of the power, and (4) question whether functions can ever be suitably categorized.
A. Approach 1: Function-Based Characterization
The first approach to answering the characterization question
engages a function-based definition that attempts to capture the
range of activities variously characterized as “legislative,” “executive,” and “judicial” powers. Proponents of this method, such as
Chief Justice Warren Burger in Bowsher v. Synar 4 or INS v.
Chadha, 5 and Justice Harry Blackmun in Freytag v. Commissioner, 6 would argue that these fundamental constitutional words
inherently entail functional, substantive content and are not
merely formal labels. 7 Therefore, categorization turns on the functions or activities that an officer performs. For example, the judicial power might be defined as carefully applying legal principles
to facts on an impartial, disinterested, case-by-case basis in a procedurally thick adversarial proceeding that results in a judgment
that will bind the parties and is not subject to revision by other
governmental actors.
Function-based attempts to characterize power as “executive” or
“legislative” are not always wholly satisfactory where the definitions of the powers are anemic. Consider Bowsher v. Synar, where
the Court’s function-based approach to characterizing the power in
question dictated the case’s outcome. 8 Under the Gramm-Rudman-

4. 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986).
5. 462 U.S. at 951 (“[T]he powers delegated to the three Branches are functionally
identifiable.”).
6. 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991).
7. Tuan Samahon, Blackmun (and Scalia) at the Bat: The Court’s Separation-of-Powers Strike Out in Freytag, 12 NEV. L.J. 691, 701–02 (2012).
8. 478 U.S. at 734.
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Hollings Act (“Act”), Congress attempted to reduce and eventually
to eliminate annual federal budget deficits over a five-year period
by setting progressively lower maximum deficit amounts until the
deficit was eliminated. 9 To reach this target, the Congressional
Budget Office (“CBO”) within the legislative branch, and the Office
of Management and Budget (“OMB”) within the executive branch
were to independently estimate the projected federal budget deficit
for the next fiscal year. 10 When the deficit exceeded a targeted limit
by a statutorily specified sum, the directors of CBO and OMB
would independently compute the budget cuts necessary at the individual program level to fall beneath the maximum deficit amount
and would report their estimated deficit and budget cut calculations to the Comptroller General (“CG”). 11 In turn, the CG, taking
the executive and legislative branch estimates, would resolve any
differences and present his own conclusions to the President, who
then was obligated to mandate sequestration of the specified
spending, barring any congressional intervention that reduced
spending below the deficit ceiling. 12 The CG, a long-standing legislative office, had always been subject to removal for cause by a joint
congressional resolution, which hypothetically afforded a measure
of congressional control. 13 The Act’s challengers argued that the
CG’s new reporting power was executive, not legislative, and violated the separation of powers by authorizing a congressional officer, subject to congressional control, to wield executive power. 14
If the Court were to have characterized the CG’s reporting power
as “legislative,” then congressional control of the CG would have
presented no constitutional difficulty. 15
Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing for the majority, accepted
the challengers’ characterization of the reporting power as “execution of the law.” 16 Curiously, Burger explained that the CG’s power
was executive because the CG “must exercise judgment concerning
9. Id. at 717.
10. Id. at 718.
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. Id. at 727–28, 730.
14. Id. at 732–33.
15. Very likely, however, the Court would have had (eventually, with a ripe challenge)
to confront the real constitutional problem presented by the Act, namely, that the President
would be compelled to execute the sequester of funds consistent with the CG’s report. For
the argument’s elaboration, see E. Donald Elliott, Regulating the Deficit After Bowsher v.
Synar, 4 YALE J. REG. 317, 320, 329–32 (1987).
16. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733.
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facts that affect” the Act’s application and must interpret the Act
“to determine precisely what budgetary calculations are required,”
which are decisions “typically made by officers charged with executing a statute.” 17 As one commentator observed, this ex ante
function-based definition of executive is curious; one could understand “interpreting law and applying it to facts [as] the essence of
a judicial, not an executive function.” 18 Thus, the definition was
both “utterly vapid and without content.” 19 Suffice it to say, the ex
ante definition of function has not been terribly successful in developing persuasive accounts of the substantive content of the
three branches’ respective powers.
In Freytag v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court rejoined the
characterization debate in the context of a challenge to the authority of the Tax Court. 20 Characterization of power was central to the
Supreme Court’s analysis. 21 A taxpayer challenged an adverse ruling by a special trial judge (“STJ”) of the Tax Court by objecting to
the constitutional validity of the STJ’s appointment by the Chief
Judge of the Tax Court. 22 If the STJ lacked a valid appointment,
as fruit of the poisonous tree, the judge’s ruling would be invalid
too. Under the excepting provision of the Appointments Clause,
Congress may opt out of the advice and consent appointment process and vest the sole power to appoint inferior officers in the heads
of executive departments or in the “Courts of Law.” 23 By statute,
Congress authorized the Chief Judge of the Tax Court to appoint
STJs. 24 If the Supreme Court could fairly characterize the Chief
Judge of the Tax Court as either a head of an executive department
or a part of the Courts of Law, the appointment was valid. 25
All the Justices on the Court agreed the appointment was valid,
but their rationales sharply split at a fundamental level. Was the
chief judge an officer exercising executive power and therefore a
head of an executive department or an officer exercising a portion
of the judicial power and therefore a part of the Courts of Law? The

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 732–33.
Elliott, supra note 15, at 324–25.
Id. at 326.
See 501 U.S. 868, 872 (1991).
See id. at 877–92.
Id. at 872.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
I.R.C. § 7443A(a) (2012 & Supp. IV 2013–2017).
See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 877–78.
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Court was sharply divided over the type of power exercised by the
Tax Court. Justice Blackmun, writing for the five-Justice majority,
thought the Chief Judge of the Tax Court was properly understood
as a part of the Courts of Law because the Court exercised the judicial power: “The Tax Court exercises judicial, rather than executive, legislative, or administrative, power.” 26
To reach his conclusion, Justice Blackmun approached the case
with a functional definition of judicial power. The Tax Court exercises “judicial power” by fulfilling its congressionally anointed
function of interpreting and “apply[ing] the Internal Revenue Code
in disputes between taxpayers and the Government.” 27 The Tax
Court is judicial because the “adjudicative body” exercised only
powers that are “quintessentially judicial in nature.” 28
These “quintessentially judicial” functions—that is, the functions most perfectly or ideally representative of the judicial
power—included construing statutes and agency regulations and
not making “political decisions.” 29 Its functions and role “closely
resemble[d] those of the federal district courts” and the Tax Court
“exercise[d] its judicial power in much the same way as the federal
district courts exercise theirs.” 30 It has the “authority to punish
contempts by fine or imprisonment,” “grant certain injunctive relief,” “order the Secretary of the Treasury to refund an overpayment,” “subpoena and examine witnesses,” “order production of
documents, and administer oaths.” 31 In characterizing the power
exercised, Justice Blackmun compared the Tax Court to an undisputed exemplar of the judicial power of the United States—the
United States District Courts—and selected those features that he
thought embodied the essence of judicial power, namely, the ability
to adjudicate and authorize remedies. 32 This focus on function isolated the essence of the judicial power as adjudication, a power that
the Tax Court also exercises. In short, Justice Blackmun in Freytag
employed a judicialized version of “the Duck Test” in looking to
function: if it looks like a judge, swims like a judge, and quacks like
a judge, it is probably a judge.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 890–91.
Id. at 891.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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Similar to Bowsher and Freytag, the resolution of Clinton v. City
of New York33 turned on whether a disputed spending cancellation
function was characterized as an exercise of legislative or executive
power. The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 granted the President authority to cancel limited, particular types of authorized budgetary
spending. 34 The Solicitor General characterized the “cancellations”
as “merely exercises of discretionary authority granted” to the
President’s office. 35 They were merely presidential execution of delegated discretionary authority. Cancellations were, “in practical
effect, no more and no less than the power to ‘decline to spend’
specified sums of money, or to ‘decline to implement’ specified tax
measures.” 36 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, rebuffed
this characterization of the cancellation power, which was actually
legislative in function, involving presidential lawmaking outside of
the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure” specified in Article I, Section 7. 37 The majority held that two
presidential cancellations violated the Presentment Clause, because, legally and practically, “the President has amended two
Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each.” 38 Justice Stevens
conceptualized this presidential authority as involvement in the
legislative process and entailing “repeal of statutes.” 39
Justice Stevens refused the President’s effort to equate cancellation with the execution of delegated authority, relying on a function-focused approach to characterization. He thought the authorized cancellations closely resembled lawmaking and the
authorizing procedure closely resembled rewriting of the Article I,
Section 7 lawmaking process, not execution under delegated authority. Unlike delegation, the exercise of cancellation power did
not depend on any factual contingency or any previously non-existing condition. 40 The Line Item Veto Act created no presidential
duty to cancel spending if any particular factual contingency were

33. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
34. Id. at 436.
35. Id. at 442.
36. Brief for the Appellants at 40, Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (No. 971374).
37. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. at 439–40 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 951 (1983)).
38. Id. at 421, 438.
39. Id. at 438 (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954).
40. Id. at 443.
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presented. 41 Moreover, exercise of cancellation power rejected, rather than advanced, subsequent congressional spending policy
judgments. 42
Justice Scalia and the dissent thought that the legislativesounding “title of the Line Item Veto Act . . . succeeded in faking
out the” majority by falsely suggesting the President was exercising legislative rather than executive power. 43 Instead, Justice
Scalia thought the cancellation function concerned only a pedestrian congressional delegation of executive discretion in law execution. 44 “[T]here is not a dime’s worth of difference between Congress’s authorizing the President to cancel a spending item, and
Congress’s authorizing money to be spent on a particular item at
the President’s discretion.” 45 This functional similarity between
cancellation and impoundment failed to persuade Justice Scalia
that legislative, rather than executive, power was at stake. As will
be seen, the presidential identity of the canceling authority was
paramount to Justice Scalia in characterizing the power as “executive.” For the Hamiltonian Justice, the power was executive and
the Court’s history of relative deference with respect to delegation
of discretion to the executive counseled restraint in judicial review. 46
B. Approach 2: Formal Identity of the Officer
The second approach categorizes power based on the formal
identity of the officer undertaking the activity. Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Freytag v. Commissioner 47 suggests this approach. This
position might be motivated by formalist scruples about predictability and the rule of law, 48 maintaining independent spheres of

41. Id. at 443–44.
42. Id. at 444.
43. Id. at 469 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 466.
46. Indeed, Professor Steven Calabresi hailed Clinton v. City of New York as a resurrection of the non-delegation doctrine. See Steven G. Calabresi, Separation of Powers and
the Rehnquist Court: The Centrality of Clinton v. City of New York, 99 NW. U.L. REV. 77,
85–86 (2004).
47. 501 U.S. 868, 911 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
48. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1176 (1989).
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action, and legitimating modern administrative innovations in
light of an eighteenth-century Constitution.
Justice Scalia characterized the power exercised by the Tax
Court as executive, not judicial. To explain his characterization,
Justice Scalia critiqued the majority’s function-based approach,
which interpreted “judicial power” as merely “the power to adjudicate in the manner of courts.” 49 Instead, Justice Scalia suggested
that adjudication was not the defining aspect of judicial power, but
merely a mode of decision-making commonly associated with the
courts, but by no means unique to them. “It is no doubt true that
all such bodies ‘adjudicate,’ i.e., they determine facts, apply a rule
of law to those facts, and thus arrive at a decision. But there is
nothing ‘inherently judicial’ about ‘adjudication.’” 50 By critiquing
the majority’s characterization as improperly equating adjudication with judicial power, Justice Scalia deemphasized inquiry into
the judicial officer’s function. Thus, even if the United States District Courts adjudicate, that does not mean that adjudication by
the Tax Court is also exercising judicial power. Justice Scalia declined to offer any functional account of what lies at the core of an
exercise of the judicial power.
Instead, Justice Scalia offered an alternative, bright-lined, formal test for characterizing power that looks to the formal identity
of the actor by considering the office’s characteristics. “[G]iven the
performance of adjudicatory functions by a federal officer, it is the
identity of the officer—not something intrinsic about the mode of
decisionmaking or type of decision—that tells us whether the judicial power is being exercised.” 51 Thus, Justice Scalia did not need
to inquire into the intrinsic or essential nature of the Tax Court’s
power; he looked to the officer’s identity. But how did Justice Scalia
ascertain the identity of the officer, whether legislative, executive,
or judicial? He considered the formal characteristics of the office.
Whether an adjudicative decision maker is exercising executive or
49. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 908 (Scalia, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 909. Similarly, there is nothing inherently executive about adjudication. In
Printz v. United States, Justice Scalia critiqued the claim that Congress had commandeered
state judges to perform an executive adjudicative function by doubting that adjudication is
any more executive than it is legislative. 521 U.S. 898, 908 n.2 (1997). “[I]t is unreasonable
to maintain that [ancillary tasks related to adjudication of citizenship applications] were
unalterably executive rather than judicial in nature.” Id. Modern regulatory agencies adjudicate, yet in doing so, they copy a mode of decision-making historically associated with
courts, but no longer unique to them. Id.
51. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 911 (emphasis added).
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judicial power turns on their attributes of office: do they “possess
life tenure and a permanent salary”? 52 If not, they cannot exercise
judicial power. Why not? Because circularly, only federal judges
have life tenure and salary protection, 53 the power exercised by
federal judges is the federal judicial power, and the federal judicial
power is assigned to Article III federal judges. If an office lacks life
tenure and salary protection, then the office must be exercising
some other power, for example, executive or perhaps legislative
power. 54
In Freytag, Justice Scalia and the concurring Justices examined
the characteristics of Tax Court judges to conclude they are not
judicial officers. 55 The judges lack tenure during good behavior as
they are removable for mere “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 56 Justice Scalia noted the President holds the
power to remove the judges and concludes, given the “here-andnow subservience” created by even qualified removal power, that
the judges must exercise executive power. 57
What is particularly striking for someone reading Freytag is that
nine Supreme Court Justices disagreed on the characterization of
power exercised by the Tax Court. On Justice Scalia’s account, the
mistake is understandable in one sense. As Justice Stevens put it
in Bowsher v. Synar, “our cases demonstrate [that] a particular
function, like a chameleon, will often take on the aspect of the office
to which it is assigned.” 58 Justice Scalia’s answer to the conundrum, then, is not to consult an office’s function in characterizing
power.
Justice Scalia’s critique of the function inquiry applies beyond
Freytag’s narrow context of falsely equating adjudication with the
judicial power. “‘Adjudication’ . . . is no more an ‘inherently’ judicial
function than the promulgation of rules governing primary conduct

52. See id.
53. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
54. Justice Scalia would have rejected any characterization that the power was legislative, because Congress did not control the judges and the Tax Court judges were not themselves members of Congress.
55. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 912.
56. Id. (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 729 (1986)).
57. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 720.
58. Id. at 749 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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is an ‘inherently’ legislative one.” 59 Thus, like adjudication, “promulgation of rules governing primary conduct” is merely a mode of
decision-making. It may be familiar to the legislative branch, but
it is not unique to that branch and is not the sine qua non of that
branch’s constitutionally assigned power. Executive-branch agencies promulgating rules are not necessarily exercising non-executive power. Agencies may act prospectively with regard to classes
of regulated parties in ways that would govern primary conduct.
The United States Code (“U.S.C.”) and the United States Code of
Federal Regulations (“C.F.R.”) are creatures of different powers—
one an exercise of legislative power and the other an exercise of
executive power. Apart from that difference, both regulate and govern parties’ primary conduct, albeit at different levels of regulatory
generality. Their character as legislative or executive is not because they differ inherently, but because officeholders with different office characteristics promulgated them. In fact, one could take
C.F.R. provisions, submit them to the “single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered,” procedure of Article I, Section 7 bicameralism, 60 where members of Congress with the formally designated characteristics of office vote, 61 and then submit it to presidential presentment, where, with formalist alchemy, executive
power “lead” is transformed into legislative power “gold.”
If Justice Scalia’s insight about adjudication and rulemaking is
correct with respect to the executive, it should have equal purchase
when examined in the context of the other branches. In fact, adjudication does occur in Congress as a mode of decision-making. Article I explicitly authorizes the United States House of Representatives to adjudicate when it acts on a case-by-case basis to impeach
officers. 62 Similarly, Article I authorizes the United States Senate
to try cases when it sits as a court of impeachment to try and perhaps convict. 63 More generally, the House and Senate acting together adjudicate when they fact gather, engage in “legislative adjudication,” and deliberate the equities of a private bill for the
benefit of a named individual or individuals. 64 Thus, Congress exercises legislative power in enacting private bills but does so in a
59. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 910 (Scalia, J., concurring).
60. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
61. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (defining characteristics of office for members of the
House of Representatives); see also id. art. I, § 3 (same, but for the Senate).
62. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
63. See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
64. See Note, Private Bills in Congress, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1684, 1687 (1966).
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mode of decision-making most familiar to that employed by judges
sitting as a court of equity. Specific constitutional disabilities provided in Article I, Section 9, such as the Bill of Attainder and Ex
Post Facto Clauses, 65 qualify the legislative vesting clause’s grant
of power and prevent Congress from acting quasi-judicially in ways
that may injure individuals. 66
Similarly, acting prospectively by reference to categories of persons or situations is not the defining attribute of legislative power.
This mode of decision-making is merely “quasi-legislative.” Beyond
Justice Scalia’s observation that this is why agencies can exercise
rulemaking authority, Justice Scalia’s modal analysis explains
how the judiciary may possess congressionally delegated authority. 67 A court uses this method of decision-making when promulgating federal rules for civil procedure, evidence, and criminal law,
or when setting forth advisory sentencing guidelines for exercises
of judicial power. 68
Justice Scalia’s dissatisfaction with the majority’s Freytag analysis has not remained merely a historical sidenote. The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit resurrected the Freytag characterization issue in a challenge to the
power of the Tax Court in Kuretski v. Commissioner. 69 In Kuretski,
taxpayers challenged the validity of an adverse judgment of the

65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
66. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 962 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (“[The
framers’] concern that a legislature should not be able unilaterally to impose a substantial
deprivation on one person was expressed not only in this general allocation of power, but
also in more specific provisions, such as the Bill of Attainder Clause, Art. 1, § 9, cl. 3.”).
67. Justice Scalia’s dissent in Mistretta v. United States is consistent with delegations
to the courts and his later articulated approach in Freytag of focusing on the formal identity
of the officer when characterizing an exercise of power. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). First, Scalia rejected equating the lawmaking function with the legislative power. “[A] certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking,
inheres in most executive or judicial action . . . .” Id. at 417 (emphasis omitted). Second, his
opinion opposed the particular congressional delegation to the United States Sentencing
Commission under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, because the Commission was neither
a court composed entirely of Article III judges nor a body controlled by Article III judges. Id.
at 413, 420–21. Accordingly, the Commission’s promulgation of sentencing standards was
not lawmaking discretion inhering in judicial action. See id. at 420.
68. But see Steven G. Calabresi et al., The Rise and Fall of the Separation of Powers,
106 NW. U.L. REV. 527, 527, 547–48, 548 n.84 (2012) (lamenting “deviations from a pure
functional separation of powers,” urging removal of the Supreme Court as a procedural rulemaker, and noting Justice Black’s separation-of-powers objections to rule adoption).
69. 755 F.3d 929 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The author litigated this case.
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Tax Court on the basis that the judgment was a product of a constitutionally flawed adjudication. 70 Tax Court judges, who under
Freytag’s characterization exercise only a portion of the judicial
power of the United States, are subject to removal by the President
on qualified grounds. 71 Even qualified grounds for removal make
removable officers here-and-now subservient to the removing officers. 72 In Kuretski, that meant the Tax Court judges exercising judicial power (per Freytag) were “here-and-now subservient” to the
chief executive officer, the President. 73 This admixture of executive
and judicial power would violate the separation of powers.
Rather than embrace this syllogism, the D.C. Circuit “underruled” the Supreme Court’s Freytag majority. 74 It rejected the
Supreme Court’s Freytag characterization of the Tax Court’s
power. 75 Freytag said that the Tax Court exercised “a portion of the
judicial power of the United States,” 76 but the D.C. Circuit read
Freytag as offering merely a clause-bound interpretation of the
meaning of “the Courts of Law” in the Appointments Clause, 77 i.e.
the excepting provision concerned only a technical interpretive
question about the method of appointment, unconnected to broader
separation-of-powers concerns. The Freytag majority, however,
characterized the Tax Court as exercising judicial power without
restricting its analysis to the question of appointments: “By resolving these disputes, the court exercises a portion of the judicial
power of the United States.” 78 Moreover, the Freytag Court had indicated several times that it was offering a whole-Constitution
analysis. This was so because “[t]he principle of separation of powers is embedded in the Appointments Clause.” 79 Freytag interpreted the “Heads of Departments” language “in the Appointments
Clause consistently with its interpretation in other constitutional
provisions,” comparing usage with other constitutional provisions. 80 Similarly, the Court acknowledged in its interpretation
70. Id. at 931–32.
71. I.R.C. § 7443(f) (2012 & Supp. II 2013–2015) (describing removal grounds as “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”).
72. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 720, 728 (1986).
73. Kuretski, 755 F.3d at 938–39.
74. See id. at 940.
75. See id. at 932, 940.
76. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 891 (1991).
77. Kuretski, 755 F.3d at 940–41.
78. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 891.
79. Id. at 882.
80. Id. at 886–87.
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that it consulted the Constitution’s cognate provisions to interpret
the Appointments Clause’s key terms. 81 Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit wrote off Freytag as a clause-bound interpretation of the Appointments Clause, thereby distinguishing it and freeing itself to
agree with Justice Scalia’s concurrence’s conclusion that the Tax
Court exercised only executive power. 82 Accordingly, Kuretski concluded the case did “not involve the prospect of presidential removal of officers in another branch.” 83 Having realigned the Tax
Court’s power as only executive, not judicial, the separation-ofpowers problem vanishes. It is no constitutional defect that the
President, in whom the executive power is vested, may remove officers who are characterized as exercising executive power.
C. Approach 3: Historical-Based Induction
Third, an inductive approach to characterizing power might accept that fundamental terms have content, but that they assume
more specified meanings after actual practice governing has informed the terms. Rather than approach the characterization of
powers by definitional deduction, power is characterized inductively from many individual historical cases of power’s exercise. To
categorize, the Court will generalize from the historical individual
data points to determine whether the disputed exercise falls within
a well-recognized domain traditionally characterized, variously, as
legislative, executive, or judicial, or whether it is a novelty unsupported by past practice. Justice Robert Jackson partially captured
this view when he said:
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and
cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from
context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed
powers into a workable government. 84

Actual experience—historical exercises of power over time—rather
than an a priori definition informs the Court’s inquiry. Generally
81. Id. at 888–89.
82. Kuretski, 755 F.3d at 940–42.
83. Id. at 939.
84. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added); see also id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (describing “gloss which life has written” on “the words of the Constitution,” including “executive
Power” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1)).

SAMAHON 523 (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

4/3/2018 10:49 AM

CHARACTERIZING POWER

583

speaking, an inductive approach is relatively deferential to the
challenged federal governmental action, because its characterization of power allows functional arrangements justified over time by
their demonstrated utility.
Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer best embodies the inductive approach. 85 In Youngstown,
the Court confronted an executive-legislative dispute in the context
of the Korean War. Under President Truman’s Executive Order
10340, Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer seized steel mills
where unionized labor was threatening to strike after unsuccessful
bargaining. 86 Secretary Sawyer directed the mill supervisors to
keep running the mills. 87 In response, the mill companies sued to
enjoin the seizure as authorized neither by the Constitution’s grant
of the executive power to the President nor by federal statute. 88
To Justice Frankfurter, “the content of the three authorities of
government is not to be derived from an abstract analysis.” 89 Instead, “[d]eeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government . . . give meaning to the words,” such as the words “the executive power.” 90 This gloss helps give substantive content to the
otherwise vague term “executive power.” 91
[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in
by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on “executive Power” vested in the
President by § 1 of Art. II. 92

Turning to historical practice, Justice Frankfurter surveyed relevant past instances of executive seizure to define the scope of executive power. 93 He deemed irrelevant those executive seizures authorized by statute or by independent constitutional powers, or
those occurring during declared wars. 94 Justice Frankfurter con-

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 583 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 611.
Id. at 610–11 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1).
Id. at 611–13.
Id.
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sidered three seizures during a six-month period prior to the American entry into World War II. 95 He concluded the three seizures
were “isolated” and failed to amount “in number, scope, duration
or contemporaneous legal justification, to the kind of executive construction of the Constitution” that would constitute them as part
of the executive power of the United States. 96 There were inadequate data points to inductively conclude that executive power encompasses executive seizures occurring without statutory or other
independent constitutional authorization. Similarly, he noted that
neither had Congress, by “long-continued acquiescence,” approved
non-statutorily authorized executive seizures as part of the executive power. 97
Of course, emphasis on historical-based induction should not
necessarily be taken as incompatible with constitutional formalism
more generally. Formalism in examining historical precedents
may inform how finely precedents are scrutinized in the inductive
process. Agency adjudication over the course of a century might
broadly suggest the propriety of executive case-by-case decisionmaking. But a particular historical pattern of requiring Article III
adjudication when private rights are present would suggest a limitation on executive power and define over time the contours of
what is encompassed by the judicial power of the United States. 98
D. Approach 4: Skepticism
Finally, whether viewed as a separate approach or as merely a
critique of the other approaches to characterizing power, the skeptical approach, such as expressed by Justice Stevens in Bowsher v.
Synar, questions whether federal governmental powers can ever
be adequately determined to enable a tripartite parceling of functions. 99 Concurring separately in Bowsher, Justice Stevens advanced a competing position on characterizing the CG’s power that
might be termed a skeptical approach to power characterization.
Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority that the power the CG
95. Id. at 613.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
559, 561–62 (2007) (noting difficulty of “Platonic” idealism in characterizing adjudicative
powers based on function and proposing instead that characterization of power should turn
on the formal presence of core individual, private rights).
99. 478 U.S. 714, 749 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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exercised could clearly be characterized as “executive” or otherwise. 100 Instead, Justice Stevens called it an “unstated and unsound premise that there is a definite line that distinguishes executive power from legislative power.” 101 He posited “the exercise of
legislative, executive, and judicial powers cannot be categorically
distributed among three mutually exclusive branches of Government,” because “governmental power cannot always be readily
characterized with only one of those three labels.” 102 Instead, Justice Stevens suggested a colorful simile of a “chameleon,” which
changes color to camouflage itself against a new background. 103
“[A] particular function, like a chameleon, will often take on the
aspect of the office to which it is assigned.” 104 This comparison suggests that characterizing power based on function might be a fool’s
errand, because the characterization of a function shifts depending
on the background context of each new office.
Paradoxically, the skeptical approach to characterization might
lead a jurist to adopt a formal identity-of-the-actor approach as a
way to avoid indeterminacy and the confessedly difficult task of
categorization. In Freytag, Justice Scalia referenced the skeptical
approach and chameleon principle expressed by Justice Stevens. 105
Nonetheless, the suggestion did not move Justice Stevens, who
joined the majority’s categorization of the Tax Court’s adjudicative
function as representing an exercise of judicial power.
II. LIVING IN JUSTICE SCALIA’S WORLD
In reviewing these approaches to characterization of power, it is
evident that Justice Scalia bequeathed an especially influential
formalist separation-of-powers legacy to the Court’s modern jurisprudence, especially as concerns the characterization of power.
The ascendance of Justice Scalia’s approach to power characterization is visible in nondelegation cases. For example, in Whitman
100. Id. at 748.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 749 (emphasis added). Indeed, no less an authority than James Madison
found the definitional task challenging. “Experience has instructed us, that no skill in the
science of government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty,
its three great provinces, the legislative, executive, and judiciary . . . .” THE FEDERALIST NO.
37, at 182 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).
103. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 749 (Stevens, J., concurring).
104. Id.
105. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 911 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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v. American Trucking Ass’ns, the nondelegation issue turned on
whether authority to promulgate Clean Air Act national ambient
air quality standards constituted delegation of legislative power or
merely permissible discretion inhering in law execution. 106 Justice
Scalia reiterated his view that the Court would not police delegations: “[W]e have ‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can
be left to those executing or applying the law.’” 107 Why did the
Court’s leading exponent of originalism embrace such a deferential
stance? Justice Scalia’s formal identity approach to power characterization animated it. After all, “[t]he essence of the nondelegation
doctrine is at bottom the essence of the separation of powers: How
do we tell what constitutional power an actor is deploying?” 108
As Justice Alito explained in Department of Transportation v.
Ass’n of American Railroads, “the formal reason why the Court
does not enforce the nondelegation doctrine with more vigilance is
that the other branches of Government have vested powers of their
own that can be used in ways that resemble lawmaking.” 109 Thus,
because rulemaking and adjudication functions can simply reflect
different modes of decision-making well within other branches’
vested powers, their presence might prove nothing more than
modal exercises of natively assigned power. The difficulty of deciding calls for deference. Similarly, in Federal Maritime Commission
v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, Justice Breyer’s dissent
referenced Justice Scalia’s modal explanation of “quasi” functions
from Freytag. 110 “The terms ‘quasi legislative’ and ‘quasi adjudicative’ indicate that the agency uses legislative like or court like procedures but that it is not, constitutionally speaking, either a legislature or a court.” 111

106. 531 U.S. 457, 462, 474 (2001).
107. Id. at 474–75 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
108. William K. Kelley, Justice Scalia, the Nondelegation Doctrine, and Constitutional
Argument, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2119 (2017).
109. 575 U.S. __, __, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1237 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
110. 535 U.S. 743, 774 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
111. Id. The analytical clarity that Justice Scalia’s approach brought to the Court’s use
of “quasi” did not always exist. Justice Robert Jackson lamented the incoherence suggested
by the “quasi” qualification on powers: “The mere retreat to the qualifying ‘quasi’ is implicit
with confession that all recognized classifications have broken down, and ‘quasi’ is a smooth
cover which we draw over our confusion, as we might use a counterpane to conceal a disordered bed.” FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487–88 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). The
formalistic clarity might be helpful, but the reality of the mess is still there, out of sight.
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Indeed, Justice Scalia’s identity-of-the-officer approach provides
a formalistic constitutional justification for the modern administrative state. Federal administrative agencies exercise only executive power in different “quasi” modes of decision-making. That justification, however, may promote form over substance. These
accumulated functions are to be deemed only decisional cosmopolitanism, not Madison’s nightmare of a monarch exercising all powers—legislative, executive, and judicial—even if their classically
associated functions are held in one set of hands.
This accumulation of power is aided by tautological application
of the identity-of-the-officer approach. Initially, Justice Scalia’s
concurring approach in Freytag was modestly offered as a necessary condition, that is, as a tool of exclusion, i.e., appropriate officer
attributes “are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the exercise of federal judicial power.” 112 This approach allowed one to conclude that a non-Article III adjudicator does not exercise a portion
of judicial power of the United States, because only a judge with
Article III tenure can exercise judicial power. The unstated premises of Justice Scalia’s approach were that (1) the power at stake is
fairly capable of being characterized as either executive or judicial
power, and (2) there is a formal constitutional requirement that
only holders of Article III tenure may permissibly hold judicial
power. Thus, Article III tenure is a necessary condition for a federal officer to exercise a portion of the judicial power of the United
States, but is insufficient to characterize disputed power as judicial. Under Justice Scalia’s approach, it is possible that an Article
III judge exercises some power other than judicial power, either by
grant or delegation, 113 or by ultra vires non-judicial action. 114
Later, however, Justice Scalia’s Freytag approach became a simplified formal identity-of-the-actor test. For example, in City of Arlington v. FCC, 115 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, lectured
dissenter Chief Justice John Roberts on the position Justice Scalia

112. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 909–10 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Paul
M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under
Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 264–65 (1990)).
113. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415–23 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2628–29 (2015)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling the majority’s ruling a “naked judicial claim to legislative—
indeed, super-legislative—power”).
115. 569 U.S. 290 (2013).
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had taken in Freytag, a case where Chief Justice Roberts had participated as counsel and had argued that the Tax Court exercised
only executive power. 116 “Agencies make rules (‘Private cattle may
be grazed on public lands X, Y, and Z subject to certain conditions’)
and conduct adjudications (‘This rancher’s grazing permit is revoked for violation of the conditions’) and have done so since the
beginning of the Republic.” 117 These observations are consistent
with Justice Scalia’s modal analysis in Freytag, which viewed rules
and adjudication as modes or methods of decision-making not
unique to other branches, and which dodged inquiry into a branch’s
intrinsic function.
In City of Arlington and elsewhere, however, Justice Scalia’s
Freytag approach became an even more hard-edged, formal rule
than initially suggested in Freytag’s modest formulation. 118 This
change resulted from Justice Scalia’s jettisoning of his position’s
qualification that officer characteristics are merely “necessary”
conditions to consider when characterizing power. 119 Instead, Justice Scalia elevated his officer identity test to a sufficient formalist
inquiry for power characterization. 120 “These [agency] activities
take ‘legislative’ and ‘judicial’ forms, but they are exercises of—indeed, under our constitutional structure they must be exercises of—
the ‘executive Power.’” 121 Justice Scalia declared, without qualification, that agency activities “are exercises of . . . the executive
power,” rather than merely “may” be exercises of executive
116. Samahon, supra note 7, at 693–94.
117. City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 304–05 n.4 (citation omitted) (citing U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 1, cl. 1).
118. See id.; see also Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 909–10 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
119. Compare City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 306–07, with Freytag, 501 U.S. at 909–10.
120. In another area of separation-of-powers jurisprudence, Justice Scalia similarly collapsed separate necessity and sufficiency inquiries into a single sufficient inquiry when determining what constitutes an “inferior,” rather than a principal, officer. Originally, in his
solo Morrison v. Olson dissent, Justice Scalia acknowledged that “it is not a sufficient condition for ‘inferior’ officer status that one be subordinate to a principal officer,” while at the
same time insisting that “it is surely a necessary condition for inferior officer status that the
officer be subordinate to another officer.” 487 U.S. 654, 722 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Yet, in Edmond v. United States, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated that to be
an “inferior officer” was to be “directed and supervised at some level by others who were
appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate,” or what
he subsequently called being a “subordinate.” 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997). Justice Souter, flagging Justice Scalia’s departure from his Morrison v. Olson dissent, concurred separately to
critique the oversimplification resulting from the collapse of the separate inquiries. Id. at
667–69 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that subordination is necessary to “inferior officer
status,” but is not “a single sufficient condition”).
121. City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 304–05 n.4 (emphasis added).
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power. 122 In fact, Justice Scalia said they “must” be exercises of executive power with a citation to the executive vesting clause, which
identifies the actor—the President (or his delegates in the executive branch) as the salient consideration in the characterization of
power. 123 Charitably read as consistent with his Freytag concurrence, Justice Scalia might be understood merely to say these
agency acts “must” be exercises of executive power if they are to be
constitutionally permissible, suggesting an unstated presumption
that “[w]hen any Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the
power the Constitution has delegated to it.” 124 Nonetheless, the
opinion’s unqualified language gives no indication that anything
more than officer identity is required to characterize power.
That this approach bears a strongly pro-executive thumbprint is
hardly a surprise; Justice Scalia pressed the gospel of a powerful
President long before Lin Manuel Miranda ever popularized Hamilton and made being a Hamiltonian fashionable. Justice Scalia’s
former law clerks readily acknowledge the slant: “Scalia’s leanings
are almost always pro-executive power,” reflecting his time working for the Office of Legal Counsel, which “left Scalia with a decided
pro-executive power bias that always asserts itself in separation of
powers cases.” 125 This executive enthusiasm reinforces the direction of Justice Scalia’s formalism, which favored the President’s
branch with the facile, truncated inquiry of the sufficient formal
identity-of-the-officer test.
The terms “legislative,” “executive,” and “judicial” were clearly
understood, as an original matter, to have substantive content. 126
Justice Scalia’s originalism, however, creates tensions with his formalism and his preference for the executive. 127 Justice Scalia, usu-

122. Id.
123. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1).
124. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
125. Calabresi, supra note 46, at 83.
126. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (“[I]f any power
whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton)
(George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) (“[T]here is no liberty, if the power of
judging be not separated from the legislature and executive powers.” (quoting BARON DE
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 154 (Thomas Nugent trans., 6th ed. 1792))).
127. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Fool for the Original Constitution, 130 HARV.
L. REV. F. 24, 26–27 (2016) (observing Justice Scalia’s “penchant for rules sometimes seemed
to get the better of his fidelity to the original Constitution” and citing Justice Scalia’s “steadfast refusal” to police excessive legislative delegation); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Gary
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ally associated with original public meaning originalism, which assumes the United States Constitution has a retrievable meaning,
fixed at the time of ratification, admitted that his jurisprudence
nonetheless had a pragmatic limitation because of his commitment
to tradition and stare decisis. Unlike Justice Thomas and his expressed willingness to overrule precedent and return to first principles, 128 Justice Scalia confessed publically he was a “fainthearted Originalist,” (mostly) uninterested in upending the socalled “New Deal settlement” of the modern administrative state
and its pro-executive terms. 129
Unfortunately, Justice Scalia’s approach to characterization
modestly limited itself to squaring the contemporary administrative state with our eighteenth-century Constitution by using a fig
leaf of nominal, formal compliance. Power characterization is
rightly important, and Justice Scalia properly focused our attention on it. For originalists, however, Justice Scalia’s approach to
characterizing power ought to serve merely as a necessary starting
line, not a sufficient finishing line.

Lawson, The Rule of Law as a Law of Law, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 483, 484–85 (2014)
(noting Justice Scalia’s resistance in his Mistretta v. United States dissent to applying the
non-delegation doctrine).
128. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“[T]here are cases in which the principle is intelligible and yet the significance of the delegated decision is simply too great for the decision to be called anything other than ‘legislative.’ . . . On a future day . . . I would be willing to address the question whether our delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from our Founders’ understanding of separation of
powers.”).
129. Justice Scalia once described himself as a “faint-hearted” originalist who would depart from results that the constitutional interpretive theory would require in cases where
the outcome would be morally objectionable. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil,
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989). Later, Justice Scalia repudiated “faint-hearted” originalism. See, e.g., MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION
165 (2013); Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 6, 2013),
http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/.

